Rethinking Western strategies toward Pakistan : an action agenda for the United States and Europe / Frédéric Grare

Résumé / Abstract : "Without Pakistan's active and full cooperation, the United States and the broader international community cannot reconstruct Afghanistan, defeat the Taliban, and turn the tide of international terrorism. Yet most observers agree that Pakistan has not provided the fullest possible cooperation. Debate is growing about whether the Pakistani state is merely unable to do better or is actively undermining international efforts in Afghanistan and against terrorism. This report makes the case that the Pakistani state bears responsibility for the worsening security situation in Afghanistan, the resurgence of the Taliban, terrorism in Kashmir, and the growth of jihadi ideology and capabilities internationally. At the core of the problem is the Pakistani military, which has dominated Pakistan's politics since 1958 and has developed over the years a nationalism based more on its own delusions of grandeur rather than on any rational analysis of the country's national interest. Inheriting a highly divided polity, the Pakistan Army has tried to muster solidarity by stoking religiosity, sectarianism, and the promotion of jihad outside its borders, particularly in Afghanistan and Kashmir. The United States and most Western countries have traditionally dealt with Pakistan according to short-term interests, and they have left deep, structural problems to "the next administration." Pakistan exploited this natural tendency by offering (for a price) assistance in achieving urgent U.S. objectives -- establishing listening posts to spy on the Soviet Union, offering to enter China, and assisting in expelling Soviet forces from Afghanistan and capturing Al Qaeda leaders. Throughout much of this history, Pakistan has been led by military dictators. In return for helping the United States pursue its objectives, these dictators obtained sizable economic and military aid and political support. As in Afghanistan today, however, the degree of Pakistan's cooperation has been much less than claimed. Indeed, Pakistan is now arming and training forces that the United States and NATO are fighting, just as the Pakistani military establishment has for some time supported Al Qaeda and other jihadi organizations operating out of Afghanistan, northern and western Pakistan, and in Kashmir. This report shows that these Pakistani priorities reflect the specific institutional interests of the military and therefore cannot be fundamentally changed unless the army gradually cedes its political role to representative civilian leaders and limits itself to defending borders. In other words, the United States and other international actors vital to Pakistan's future must stop taking the metaphorical bribe of partial Pakistani cooperation in fighting Al Qaeda terrorists in return for propping up an unrepresentative, military government. This report calls for a new strategy designed to encourage Pakistanis, particularly the military, to reestablish the preeminence of civilian government according to the Pakistani constitution. The key to this strategy is to not allow Pakistan to trade off democratization for the country's cooperation on terrorism, Afghanistan, and to a lesser extent, Kashmir. Pakistani progress on these objectives would bring increased international rewards, while its abandonment of a single one of them would expose the Pakistani leadership to the withdrawal of foreign assistance. Conditionality of cooperation assistance applied by a large number of countries, not simply by the United States, should be applied to Pakistan's leadership, in particular the military leadership, and should not affect the general population." (p. 5)